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person of the opposite sex who is not their spouse and is under seventeen
years of age. 4 Thus, the determination in Groves that the Texas Penal
Code is gender-neutral relieved the court from having to decide what is the
proper test to apply for statutes challenged on the ground of equal protection.
Nonetheless, while the First Circuit emphatically limited its holding to
the particular statute involved, other jurisdictions should take heed of
the decision. Meloon represents a logical application of the rule in Craig
to a gender-based criminal law. While the decision may require revision
of some states' criminal laws, such revisions can only further the cause of
equal protection of the law.
Thomas E. Sisson
CRIMINAL LAW-Plea Bargaining-Due Process Not
Violated When Prosecutor Carries Out Threat to
Reindict Accused on More Serious Charges
After Plea Bargain on Original Charge
Is Refused
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Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978).

Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted under a Kentucky statute' for uttering a
forged check. After arraignment, pretrial conferences were held with the
prosecuting attorney who offered to recommend a five year sentence if
Hayes would plead guilty. He also warned Hayes that if he did not plead
guilty he would be reindicted under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act.2
Hayes would, therefore, face a mandatory life sentence rather than a two
to ten year sentence. After Hayes refused the offer and chose not to plead
guilty, the prosecutor obtained an indictment under the recidivist statute.
A jury found Hayes guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment as
required under the statute.3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed
Hayes' conviction in an unpublished opinion.' The United States District
84. See Ex parte Groves, No. 58,945, slip op. at 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 1978) (not
yet reported).

1. Ky. REV. STAT. § 434.130 (1970) (current version at Ky. REV. STAT. § 516.020 (1975)).
2. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1970) (current version at Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.080
(Supp. 1976)). This statute provided for a mandatory life sentence if a person is convicted of
a felony for the third time. Id.
98 S. Ct. 663, 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604,
U.S. __, -,
3. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 608 (1978). In 1961 when Hayes was seventeen he plead guilty to a charge of detaining a
female and served five years in the state reformatory. In 1970 he was convicted of robbery
98 S.
and sentenced to five years imprisonment, but was released on probation. Id. at -,
Ct. at 666 n.3, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 608 n.3.
98 S. Ct. at 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 608.
4. Id. at -,
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Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Hayes a writ of habeas
corpus holding that neither the sentence nor the indictment violated the
defendant's constitutional rights.5 An appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit where the district court's judgment was
reversed.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 7
Held-Reversed. A defendant's due process rights are not violated if, after
an offered plea bargain he refuses to plead guilty, and the prosecutor
carries out his threat to reindict for an offense carrying greater sanctions.'
Although plea bargaining has been in existence in this country since at
least the early part of the twentieth century,9 it has only recently been
recognized by the courts as a legitimate practice.'" When first developed,
plea bargaining took the form of a silent agreement." Today, however, if a
plea agreement is reached in federal court, its disclosure in open court is
required to be on the record. Most criminal cases in this country are
5. Id. at __,
98 S. Ct. at 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 608. The opinion of the district court is
unreported. Id. at .,
98 S. Ct. at 666 n.4, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 608 n.4.
6. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, U.S. , 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978).
7. Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
U.S. -,
97 S. Ct. 2672, 53 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1978).
8. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, - U.S ....
98 S. Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604,
611-12 (1978).
9. See Note, Plea Bargaining-ProposedAmendments to Federal Criminal Rule 11, 56
MINN. L. REv. 718, 725-26 (1972). There is some support for the position that plea bargaining
began early in the nineteenth century. See Case Comment, People v. Seikoff, The Route to
Rational Plea Bargaining,21 CAIN. LAWYER 144, 145 n.6 (1975).
10. Beall, Principles of Plea Bargaining, 9 Loy. Cm. L.J. 175, 178-79 (1977); see, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d
721, 724 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 892 (1968). See generally J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING
AND GUILTY PLEAS

§§ 2.01, .02 (1978).

11. Beall, Principles of Plea Bargaining, 9 Loy. CHI. L.J. 175, 177 (1977). The defense
counsel and the prosecutor informally agreed off the record that the defendant would plead
guilty in return for a recommendation of leniency. The prosecutor never discussed the agreement with the defendant personally. The defendant was instructed to plead guilty and if
asked whether any agreement or understanding had been made, he was told to give a negative
response. Id. at 177-81.
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2); see, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465,
467 (1969) (strict compliance with Rule 11 required); Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775,
781-82 (5th Cir.) (defendant and counsel have duty to disclose existence and details of any
agreement), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530
(4th Cir. 1970) (district judges should ask counsel whether plea bargaining has taken place).
See generally J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 6.10 (1978). Disclosure on record
has been made applicable to states. See, e.g., People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 417-18, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 393 (1970) (basis of bargain should be disclosed to the court); Gibson v. State, 532
S.W.2d 69, 75-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (bring "fruit of negotiation" into the record); State
ex rel Clancy v. Coiner, 179 S.E.2d 726, 733 (W. Va. 1971) (subjects plea bargaining to "strong
light of full disclosure"). See generally J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 6.10
(1978).
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concluded without a trial. 3 In Santobello v. New York" the United States
Supreme Court recognized that "plea bargaining is an essential component
of the administration of justice."' 5 Through the plea bargaining process,
the defendant avoids extended pretrial imprisonment, the burdens and
uncertainties of trial are eliminated, and the defendant is given a quick
disposition of his case."6 This latter feature protects the public from additional crimes by those on bail, and enables prosecutors and judges to
conserve resources.' 7 Thus, plea bargaining is not only an essential element
of the judicial process, but also a highly desirable one."
Despite these benefits to the criminal justice system, however, plea bargaining places certain burdens on the criminally accused. The plea bargaining process affects a criminal defendant's right against self incrimination, his right to a fair trial, and the right to confront his accusers as
guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments.' 9 In order to insure that
13. Approximately 90% of all criminal cases are resolved through guilty pleas. Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970); see Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REv. 564, 564 n.1 (1977).
14. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
15. Id. at 260. In Santobello, the petitioner had reached a plea agreement with the
prosecutor. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, a different prosecutor failed to honor the
commitment made by the original prosecutor. The Supreme Court held that when a defendant pleads guilty based upon agreements or promises made with a prosecutor, those promises must be kept no matter who argues the case before the court. Id. at 262. In enforcing the
commitment, the Court emphasized that the plea must be voluntary. Id. at 261-62; see, e.g.,
Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 293 A.2d 57, 60 (Pa. 1972); People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr.
385, 393 (1970).
16. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970). See generally
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,36 U. Cli. L. REv. 50, 52-58 (1968).
18. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); State v. Cato, 290 A.2d 901, 901
(Conn.Super. Ct. 1972). But see Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 1387, 1411 (1970). Prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel should not be able to
diminish constitutional protections without any supervision; such diminution should come
only through public approval. Id. at 1411.
19. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969); Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970); see U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. If the judge is satisfied that there is a factual basis
for the defendant's plea, then the plea is itself a conviction; nothing more remains but to
render the judgment and determine the punishment. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220, 223-24 (1927); see United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 892 (1968); J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAs § 1.05[1] (1978).
A defendant in a state prosecution enjoys these same rights through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (right
to trial by jury); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (right not to plead guilty);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (right to confront one's accusers); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (right against self incrimination).
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these rights are provided a defendant, the Supreme Court requires that
confessions and waivers of constitutional rights be made voluntarily, knowingly, and with knowledge of the consequences.2" The question of the voluntariness of a guilty plea has been the subject of much litigation.' The
Supreme Court dealt with this question in a series of cases known as the
Brady Trilogy.22 Initially, the Court seemed reluctant to declare a guilty
plea involuntary. 3 Today, however, specific guidelines are imposed. Before
a guilty plea can be accepted in federal court the trial judge must ask the
defendant if his plea is voluntary and if he understands the consequences
of pleading guilty.2
Few cases have dealt directly with the issue of vindictiveness during the
plea bargaining process. There are numerous cases, however, involving
vindictiveness during various phases of criminal proceedings.25 In North
20. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964). In
Brady v. United States the Supreme Court quoted with approval the definition of an acceptable guilty plea formulated by the Fifth Circuit.
(A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including
the actual values of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his
own counsel, must stand unless induced by the threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d
571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
21. See, e.g., Streets v. Wainwright, 436 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 910 (1971) (mother's appeal to son to plead guilty did not render guilty plea involuntary); Tarnabine v. Warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary, 331 F. Supp. 975, 977 (E.D. La.
1971) (lawyer's misrepresentation to defendant of terms of plea bargain invalidated plea);
Morris v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (mistaken belief that
evidence admissible not enough to invalidate plea).
22. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794-96 (1970); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771-74 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-55 (1970). See generally
Note, The Supreme Court's Changed View of the Guilty Plea, 4 MEM. L. REv. 79, 82-85 (1973).
23. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). A guilty plea was not invalidated merely because it was entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty. Id. at 755. See
also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). In Parker,the defendant was locked in a
cell without food or water until he confessed to the crime. The court held that his plea of
guilty was not involuntary since it was one month after the confession. Id. at 795-96. See
generally Note, The Supreme Court's Changed View of the Guilty Plea, 4 MEM. L. REv. 79
(1973).
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d). In Boykin v. Alabama the Court indicated that the protection
provided in the federal courts by rule 11 may be applicable to state criminal proceedings as
a fundamental right governed by the due process clause. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242-44 (1969).
25. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 723-24 (1969); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 105 (1977); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Lippi, 435 F.
Supp. 808, 811-14 (D.N.J. 1977).
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Carolina v. Pearce" the United States Supreme Court established a rule
to protect defendants from retaliation for the exercise of their procedural
rights. 7 The Court held that when a person is resentenced by the court
after having successfully appealed his original conviction, retaliation can
play no part in imposing the second sentence."' If a stricter sentence is to
be imposed, the reasons for assessing that sentence must affirmatively
appear on the record.2" In Blackledge v. Perry1' the Supreme Court applied
the Pearce rule proscribing judicial vindictiveness to a case involving prosecutorial vindictiveness. 3 In response to Perry's exercise of his statutory
right to trial de novo, the prosecutor obtained a new indictment charging
a more serious crime.32 The Court held that a defendant should be free from
fear of prosecutorial retaliation.2 3 Consequently, the potential for, or appearance of, prosecutorial vindictiveness is enough to require reversal of a
conviction."
Subsequent decisions have extended the rule established in Pearce and
Blackledge so that it no longer applies only to situations involving retrial
after an appeal.3" It has been held that due process is violated when the
charges against a defendant are increased after he has been granted a
mistrial unless the prosecutor justifies the increase. 3 The Pearce and
Blackledge rule has also been applied to pretrial situations. Defendants
26. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
27. Id. at 725. Pearce was convicted of assault with the intent to commit rape and
sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in the penitentiary. Several years later he was granted a
new trial and was again found guilty. Punishment was assessed at eight years which, when
added to the time already served, was longer than the original sentence. Id. at 713.
28. Id. at 725; see United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
29. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
30. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
31. Id. at 27-28. Perry was in the penitentiary when he became involved in a fight with
another inmate. He was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and given a six month
sentence. Perry exercised his statutory right and requested a trial de novo in the superior
court. Id. at 22.
32. Id. at 22-23.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id. at 28; see United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lippi, 435
F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977); United States v. Lee, 435 F. Supp. 974, 980 (E.D. Tenn.
1976).
35. See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.) (reindictment
after transfer of venue), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 105 (1977); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170, 1173 (1976) (reindictment following successful challenge of original conviction); United
States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1368 (1976) (increased charges when defendant
refused to waive right to trial by district judge).
36. See United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Defendant was
originally charged with second degree murder and carrying a dangerous weapon. After a
mistrial was declared the defendant was reindicted for first degree murder and carrying a
dangerous weapon. Id. at 409.
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cannot be punished for refusing to waive their right to a trial by a district
judge or a magistrate,37 nor can a prosecutor unjustifiably increase the
charges against a defendant when the defendant successfullly obtains a
transfer of venue. 8 In such situations, the prosecutor who subsequently
pursues a more severe charge has the burden of dispelling the appearance
of vindictiveness." Following a defendant's exercise of rights or his refusal
to waive certain rights, a heavier sentence is not absolutely prohibited,,
nor is imposition of more severe charges against a defendant;4 but due
process requires that the reasons for imposing heavier sentences or more
severe charges must affirmatively appear of record.2
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes'" the United States Supreme Court considered whether a prosecutor violated the defendant's due process rights by
carrying out his threat to reindict the defendant under a recidivist statute
after the defendant refused to plead guilty." Finding no due process violation, the Court held that the consequent increase in the defendant's sentence was the result of plea bargaining.'" It determined that the recidivist
charge was fully justified by the evidence, that the prosecutor had the
evidence to charge Hayes under the recidivist statute when the original
indictment was obtained, and that Hayes knew the terms of the offer when
37. See United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant recharged after refusing to waive right to trial by district judge); United States v. Lippi,
435 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977) (defendant reindicted after refusing to waive right to trial
by magistrate).
38. See United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.) (defendant reindicted
when case successfully transferred to California), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 105 (1977).
39. Id. at 1227; United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977).
40. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973) (different jury with no
knowledge of first sentence); Colten v. Kennedy, 407 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972) (different court
with no knowledge of prior sentence); Martinez v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir.)
(second indictment same as first but no plea agreement under second), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct.
325 (1976).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416-17 (1974) (evidence of additional crimes obtained after first indictment or information filed); United States v. Mallah,
503 F.2d 971, 988 (2d Cir. 1974) (reindictment on different charges justified by newly discovered information); Culbertson v. Wainwright, 453 F.2d 1219, 1220 (5th Cir. 1972) (upon
assault victim's death after first trial defendant was reindicted for murder).
42. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969); United States v. RuesgaMartinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 415
(D.C.Cir. 1974); United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.J. 1977); United States
v. Lee, 435 F. Supp. 974, 977 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
43. U.S. , 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978).
44. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 665, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 607.
45. Id. at _,
98 S. Ct. at 669, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 612. While recognizing that plea
bargaining plays an important role in the criminal justice system, the Sixth Circuit held that
the prosecutor's conduct was vindictive, and was, therefore, in violation of the defendant's
right to due process. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, U.S. , 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978).
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he made the decision not to plead guilty." Since the defendant was in a
plea bargaining situation in which he could accept or reject the prosecutor's offer, the prosecutor's response was not punishment or retaliation.,7
One's right to due process is violated, the Court reasoned, when he is
punished for exercising a legal right," but facing the choice between demanding a trial or the possibility of a more severe sentence is a legitimate
consequence of plea bargaining rather than a punishment." In reaffirming
the plea bargaining process, the Court acknowledged that the prosecutor's
interest was to persuade the defendant to waive his right to a trial.50 The
majority noted that the situation would have been no different if Hayes
had originally been charged as a recidivist and the prosecutor had offered
to drop the recidivist charge in exchange for the guilty plea."
A dissenting opinion, in which two justices joined, criticized the majority
for limiting the principles established in Pearce and Blackledge.52 It was
argued that the element of vindictiveness which was proscribed in those
decisions was present to the same extent in this case.5 3 The dissenting
justices reasoned that it is vindictiveness at any phase of prosecution that
the due process clause prohibits." Thus, no distinction should be made
between vindictiveness occurring after the exercise of a legal right and
vindictiveness occurring after the defendant asserts his right to plead not
guilty. 5
Throughout the development of the Pearce and Blackledge rule it has
been emphasized that the defendant need not prove actual vindictiveness
on the part of the prosecutor. The rule was designed so that the defendant
could be free from the fear of retaliation, whether judicial or prosecutorial,
for insisting on his statutory or constitutional rights.57 The holding in the
46. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, U.S .
.
98 S. Ct. 663, 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604,
609 (1978).
47. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 610-11.
48. Id. at __,98 S. Ct. at 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 610.
49. Id. at
, 98 S. Ct. at 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 611.
50. Id. at..,
98 S. Ct. at 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 611.
51. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 609.
52. Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 669, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 612 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (defendant entitled to be free from fear of prosecutorial retaliation); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (defendant entitled to
be free from fear of judicial retaliation).
53. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, U.S.....
98 S. Ct. 663, 669-70, 54 L. Ed. 2d
604, 613 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 670, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 613-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 670, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 613-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 725 (1969); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp.
808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977).
57. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
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Bordenkircher case is difficult to reconcile with these previous decisions.
The prosecutor in Bordenkircher did not deny that his only reason for
reindicting Hayes was because of his refusal to enter a plea agreement."
Hayes' refusal was an assertion of his right to plead not guilty. Although
the rule is supposed to guard against prosecutorial vindictiveness after the
assertion of legal rights, Bordenkircherappears to carve out an exception:
in the plea bargaining arena, behavior that is otherwise questionable may
be tolerated."
The majority opinion limited its holding to cases in which the prosecutor
openly confronts the defendant with the decision of going to trial under a
habitual criminal charge or waiving his right to a trial and facing a more
lenient charge. 0 Even in light of this limitation, the decision may place
undue hardship on future defendants in similar circumstances. Plea bargaining has been upheld because of the mutuality of its advantages and
its benefits to defendants and prosecutors.6 When a defendant engages in
plea bargaining he usually does so in hopes of receiving a more lenient
sentence,"2 while a prosecutor hopes to persuade a defendant to forego his
right to a trial. 3 Thus, each party expects to benefit from the bargaining
process. If, however, the prosecutor is allowed to act vindictively, the mutuality of advantage disappears because only the prosecutor will receive a
benefit. The defendant is merely given an opportunity to avoid being disadvantaged; Hayes was "offered" a life sentence rather than a two to ten
year sentence. The majority describes plea bargaining as a "give-andtake" situation,6 ' however, in the instant case the prosecutor took all and
gave nothing.
The majority opinion notes that Hayes was in the same situation as if
he had been originally charged under the recidivist statute and was offered
a reduction of that charge. 5 When an offer by the prosecution to reduce
charges is refused, the defendant will often be sentenced in accordance
with the the original charge rather than with the offered charge. There is
a difference, however, between cases where the disparity in sentences is the
711, 725 (1969); see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1175 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lippi, 435
F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977).
98 S. Ct. 663, 665, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604,
U.S ....
58. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 607 (1978).
98 S. Ct. at 669, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 612.
59. Id. at -,
60. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 669, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 612.
61. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 71 (1977); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970).
62. See J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.07[31 (1978) (prosecutors offer

defendant a charge reduction which reduces maximum sentence judge may impose).
__,
98 S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d
63. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, - U.S. __,
604, 611 (1978).

64. Id. at
65. Id. at

,
__,

98 S. Ct. at 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 610-11.
98 S. Ct. at 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 609.
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result of the defendant's own choice of strategy and cases where the greater
sentence is a result of retaliation on the part of the prosecutor." For example, in cases in which a defendant is originally charged under a felony
indictment and is thereafter offered a reduction of the charge in exchange
for a guilty plea, it has been consistently held that a subsequent higher
sentence is a result of defendant's trial strategy. 7 As such, there is no
escalation of the government's charge and no facts suggesting prosecutorial
vindictiveness. 8 The defendant chooses whether to go to trial and face the
charges against him or to waive his right to a trial and face reduced
charges. Even though the defendant is discouraged from insisting on his
trial rights, his waiver is voluntary." In cases involving retaliation, however, the defendant is faced with a harsher sentence or a more serious
charge because of his refusal to waive a statutory, constitutional, or common law right.7" When a defendant waives one of his statutory or constitutional rights, such as his right to a trial, that waiver must be voluntary. 7'
Coercion may exist in a variety of forms arising from the conduct of the
prosecutor." In the instant case, Hayes was indicted under the recidivist

66. See, e.g., Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
932 (1973); Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); Alvarez v.
State, 536 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 325 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Martinez v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 325 (1976); Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
932 (1973); Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
68. Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932 (1973);
Alvarez v. State, 536 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 325 (1976).
69. See Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932
(1973); Alvarez v. State, 536 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 325
(1976). A plea is not involuntary even though it is induced by the defendant's desire to limit
the maximum possible sentence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (thirty
years rather than a life sentence); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794-95 (1970) (life
sentence rather than death).
70. See, e.g., United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.) (reindictment
after transfer of venue), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 105 (1977); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976) (reindictment following successful challenge of original conviction);
United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976) (increased charges
when defendant refused to waive right to trial by district judge). The Supreme Court has
emphasized that if the only reason for a state practice is to discourage a defendant from
insisting on his constitutional rights, that practice is "patently unconstitutional." See, e.g.,
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 n.20 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
631 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
71. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970); Rohrer v. Montana, 237 F.
Supp. 747, 749 (D. Mont. 1965); State v. Sather, 564 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Mont. 1977); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(d).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976) (reindictment
following successful challenge of original conviction); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534
F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976) (increased charges when defendant refused to waive right to
trial by district judge); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reindictment after mistrial).
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statute because he would not plead guilty.73 The prosecutor warned that if
Hayes did not save the court the inconvenience of going to trial he would
face the additional charge. 7' The prosecutor attempted to coerce Hayes
into pleading guilty by threatening him with a life sentence instead of the
two to ten year sentence which he originally faced.75 Unlike the trial strategy cases"6 the escalation of the defendant's sentence in this case was due
to prosecutorial vindictiveness.77
In some situations obtaining a new indictment may be a proper use of
the prosecutor's power. In his dissenting opinion Justice Powell argued
that if the defendant could reasonably have been charged under the habitual criminal act in the first instance, then the prosecutor's conduct would
be acceptable.78 Courts have held that it is a violation of the eighth amendment's provision against cruel and unusual punishment to prosecute a
defendant under a recidivist statute if his previous convictions were minor
felonies.7 Hayes' prior convictions were for detaining a female and robbery. He did not serve any time in jail, but was sent to a reformatory for
his first offense and given a probated sentence for the second.' Considering
that at least one of Hayes' prior convictions could be considered a minor
felony and that the only new charge against Hayes was forgery of an eightyeight dollar check, the prosecutor would have faced the possibility of a
constitutional attack had he initially charged Hayes under the recidivist
statute. If initial charges under the recidivist statute would be unreasonable, it is doubly unfair to allow the prosecutor to reindict the defendant
under the statute for purely retaliatory motives.
Erosion of the rule established in Pearce and Blackledge increases the
73. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, - U.S ....
98 S. Ct. 663, 666, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604,
608 (1978).
74.%Id. at -,
98 S. Ct. at 665, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 607.
75. Id. at _,
98 S. Ct. at 669-70, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 613 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Martinez v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 325 (1976); Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
932 (1973); Alvarez v. State, 536 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
325 (1976).
77. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, U.S .....
98 S. Ct. 663, 669-70, 54 L. Ed.
2d 604, 613-14 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at
, 98 S. Ct. at 671-72, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 615-16 (Powell, J., dissenting). As of
1975 Hayes would not be eligible for conviction under the recidivist statute. The Kentucky
recidivist statute now provides that a previous conviction is a basis for enhanced sentencing
only if a prison term of one year or more was imposed, the sentence or probation completed
within five years of the present offense, and the offender eighteen years of age when the
offense was committed. See Ky. REv. STAT. §532.080 (2) (Supp. 1976).
79. See, e.g., Browne v. Estelle, 544 F.2d 1244, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1977); Hart v. Coiner,
483 F.2d 136, 140-43 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Rogers v. United
States, 304 F.2d 520, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1962).
80. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, - U.S ....
98 S. Ct. 663, 666 n.3, 54 L. Ed. 2d
604, 608 n.3 (1978).
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